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SENT TO:	DELIVER TO:	EXTENSION	To a
TREASURY K-1	JAMES H. FALL	566-2373	-
TREASURY. K-/	SUSAN SCHWIEN	566-2716	
STATE &	SUE SACRITO INR	647-5213	8727
STATE B	RICHARD DOTSON ARA/PAN	647-4982	1915
STATE 0	RICHARD WYROUGH ARA/PAN	647-6614	4915
STATE B	JOHN HARRINGTON ARA/ECP	647-4643	3234
STATE \$	DICK ROGOSIAN FR/OMA	647-9497	4830
STATE B	DAVID W. NORLAND EB/IFD/OMA	647-5910	4830
STATE 3	ERIC LUFTMAN ARA/ECP	647-4643	3234
STATE &	JOHN LOVAAS AID/LAC/CEN	647-9108	5256

REMARKS:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: AUG 2002

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PANAMA ECONOMIC BRIEF NUMBER ONE: EMPLOYMENT TREND DURING THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

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STATE B	RICHARD DOTSON ARA/PAN	647-5213	8727
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STATE &	JOHN HARRINGTON ARA/ECP	647-6614	4915
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	DAVID W. NORLAND EB/IFD/OMA	647-5910	1830
TATE 3	ERIC LUFTMAN ARA/ECP	647-4643	3234
TATE &	JOHN LOVAAS AID/LAC/CEN	647-9108	5256

REMARKS :

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REVERES

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MEMORANDUM TO: Recipients



The attached is the first of a series of economic briefs we hope to produce on Panama as the US and the new government begin the task of economic reconstruction. This one is on unemployment. We plan to follow it with looks at capital flight and the banking sector.

I hope you find this useful. If you have any questions or comments, or if you have suggestions for other topics,

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MEMORANDUM

2 January 1990

SUBJECT: Panama Economic Brief Number One: Employment Trends During the Economic Crisis

Panama's unemployment rate has almost doubled since 1987, largely due to the economic contraction that followed the imposition of economic sanctions by the United States against the government of Gen. Manuel Noriega (Table 1). The majority of the roughly 95,000 workers added to Panama's unemployment roles since 1987 probably came from three sectors: commerce, manufacturing, and construction. Employment in the two largest sectors in Panama--agriculture and government--has not declined significantly since the crisis began.

Economic Background

Commercial activity dropped significantly between 1987 and 1989, primarily as a result of less government income and spending, a decline in available credit, and a fall in general business confidence. The imposition of sanctions by the United States in April 1988 caused over \$350 million dollars in Panama Canal tolls and fees, income taxes from US firms operating in Panama, and bank assets to be withheld from the Panamanian economy. A run in March 1988 forced Panamanian banks to restrict cash withdrawals and reduce lending activity. Political upheaval and lack of confidence in Panama's stability as a business center led offshore banks to re-book assets in other financial centers, and caused international businesses to take employment-generating capital elsewhere.

Commerce

This sector is Panama's third largest employment generator, with over 93,000 laborers in 1986 (Table 2). Since 1987, production in this sector has fallen by over 40 percent (Table 3). Government expenditures during the crisis were limited to salary payments because of sharp drops in revenue, and private sector purchasing activity declined because of a lack of credit and postponed investment decisions.

inventories fell 2.5 percent on average 4 191939, and that businesses were reducing general, administrative, and make

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costs, including labor. Anecdotal reporting suggests a general drop in disposable income encouraged many to eat at home instead of in restaurants. Average hotel occupancy has fallen considerably since 1987, the result of an uncertain political climate in Panama, and a precipitous drop in business and banking activity by foreigners.

Manufacturing

Manufacturing in Panama is largely geared to supplying domestic needs, and its 62,500 (1986) workers are therefore vulnerable to drops in domestic purchasing. Production in the manufacturing sector fell 28 percent between 1987 and 1989. In addition to the effect of a drop in consumption of manufactured goods, employment was affected by the slowdown in production caused by bank credit constraints. One example of the decline in manufacturing is the textile industry, which by mid-1988, had let all but 700 of its 4,000 workers go, Employment in the manufacturing sector will rebound as businesses begin to restock inventories and consumers resume purchases of domestically produced goods such as clothing, beverages, and tobacco.

Construction

The lack of credit availability, failing government spending, and an unfavorable climate for business expansion caused a 72 percent production drop in the constuction sector between 1987 and 1989. The roughly 34,000 workers employed in this industry in 1986 have been directly affected by nearly non-existent construction activity.

War damage repairs and investment in intrastructural projects neglected by Noriega could quickly re-employ several thousand construction workers.

Other Sectors

Unemployment has also increased in the banking sector, which employs about 10,000 Panamanian workers. Hiring by financial institutions—primarily offshore banks—will likely resume as the domestic political situation stabilizes and as economic conditions allow them to offer competitive financial products and services to attract new business.

The Petroterminales oil pipeline, while showing a drop in production of 50 percent since 1987, is a highly capital intensive project and has little direct bearing on employment. The project employs only 400 workers full time, and contracts 400 additional workers to provide other needed services. The pipeline's chief benefit to the government is

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as a source of income for investment in other employmentgenerating projects.

The Colon Free Trade Zone has largely weathered the 30-month political crisis, serving as an economic bright spot for the Noriega regime. Employment in the Zone, which fluctuates with the volume of trade between Latin America and the rest of the world, has remained between 7,500 and 9,500 workers since 1986. Trade through the Zone will be disrupted temporarily because of an estimated \$10 million in war damage and looting losses, but the medium-term effect on Zone employment will be minimal. The Zone, the pipeline, and the Panama Canal--which employs about 12,000 Panamanians--have all increased in importance as a share of GDP since mid-1987, and probably will be the government's most reliable sources of income and employment during the coming year (Table 4).

Impediments to Employment

Panama's Labor Code, adopted in 1972 to advance workers' rights and regulate the conduct of employer-employee relations, is a serious impediment to the free movement of labor resources. The Code stipulates that an employee's salary may not be reduced under any circumstances. Provisions also call for very high severance payments in the event of dismissal. Furthermore, after two years of employment, a worker cannot be dismissed without a legal hearing into the reasons for severance. Larger firms are required to maintain a reserve to cover possible severance payments, and are obligated to continue such payments in the event of bankruptcy.

The Labor Code has served as a disincentive to hiring workers, and has failed to boost real wages. To remain competitive, companies have turned to substituting capital inputs for labor inputs. Real wages have remained stagnant since the Code was adopted, and the job market remains tight for new entrants into the labor force. Modifications to the labor code make good business sense, but have been resisted by Panamanian legislators who fear the political impact of exposing Panamanian labor to downward wage pressures.

Table 1

Panamanian Census Bureau Employment Figures 1982-1989

Year	Employed	Unemployed	Rate
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987	561,064 597,345 613,937 626,973 643,827 681,141 643,500	51,502 64,219 68,795 88,251 75,747 89,331 141,264	8.4 - 9.7 10.1 12.3 10.5 11.6 18.0
1989 ¹	616,000	184,000	23.0

Projected
Data: State Department Reporting

Table 2

Panamanian Employment by Sector (1986)

Sector		Percent	Employees
Commerce, Res Manufacturing Transportation Construction	Forestry, Fishing ommunity Services taurants, Hotels, Mining n	28.6 28.4 14.6 9.7 5.6 5.3 4.0 4.0	184,134 182,847 93,999 62,451 36,054 34,123 25,753 25,753 9,657
		. 2	1,288

Table 3

Panama: GDP by Sector (\$ millions)

	1987	19891	2 Change
Government Services	681.3	590. 0	
Canal Canal	482.5		(13.4)
Finance and Real Estate		445.0	(7.8)
Agriculture	774.7	428.0	(37.8)
Other	535. S	395.3	(26.2)
·	483.9	390.5	(19.3)
Commerce, Restaurants, Hotels	609.0	355.8	(41.6)
Manufacturing	475.5	341.5	
Transport and Communications	281.8		(28.2)
Utilities		276.7	(1.8)
Colon Free Zone	191.4	213.5	11.5
	202.1	205.5	1.7
Pipeline	369.7	185.0	(50.0)
Construction	229.9	63,8	(72.2)
Total	5317.3	3890.6	(26.8)
1_			•

1Projected

Table 4

Panama: Share of GDP by Sector (percent)

Sector	1987	19891	Change
Finance and Real Estate Government Services Canal Other Agriculture Manufacturing Commerce, Restaurants, Hotels Transport and Communications Colon Free Zone Utilities	1987 14.6 12.8 9.1 9.1 10.1 8.9 11.5 5.3 3.8	1989 ¹ 11.0 15.0 11.4 10.0 10.2 8.8 9.1 7.1 5.3 5.5	(3.6) 2.2 2.3 0.9 0.1 (0.1) (2.4) 1.8 1.5
Pipeline Construction	7.0 4.3	4.8 1.6	(2.2) (2.7)

1Projected